While religion and state express a common truth, no particular ting sects. On the one hand, then, Hegel raises the State above all e sect over relations to religion), but explicitl out of the interest philosophy has in the development of nationstates.
eprejudice against Catholics. 4 may teach us not only about the enduring philosophical import of principle to simply be that of self-conscious freedom, Walter Jaeschke, "Christianity and Secularity in Hegel's Concept of the State", -foundation of the principle, thereby distinguishing Hegel's conception of the state from the post-Hegelian, secular one. 
I. Philosophy's Interest in World History
"World history," for Hegel, essentially treats the progression beprominence and unfolding of a common truth. It is thus not a chronology of major state-based events, but the essentially philosophical comprehension e grounded in human essence, ccordingly, Hegel's discussion focusses primarily on a defense of "philosophical history," or the presupposition that "history has an essential and actual end… [ , that] osophical history accordingly seeks the "substantial and underlying essence, not the trivialities of external existence and contingency" ( ), and thereby judges historical events in terms of "the liberation of the spiritual substance" from all that contingently attaches to be done in all legal cases, philosophy's exclusive interest lies in seeing that freedom's goal of self-liberation from the merely given is actually achieved in history. Philosophy, in short, is essentially the and absolute [ … of right is neither the state-form of constitutional monarchy, nor any form religious conscience corresponding to it, but humanity's essential activity of liberating itself from given, external determinations.
cing the historical progress of nationare likely to have on the emancipatory destiny of human freedom. Philosophical history, then, is not just an account of the past, but its , critically appraised in light of the free essence of spirit.
II. History and Religion

Thus, philosophy's permanent interest lies in human emancipation
While it is certainly true that freedom is not a metaphysical abstracforms of nation-states, rather than the biographies of historical tools" ( rminations of 5 A genuine, non-despotic nation-state explicitly posits the implicit totality of the various actions, customs onsists of rstanding of their essence ( state explicitly posits the overall concrete product of those various , the "self-conscious form -states, efforts in institut -conscious unity).
-forms is implicitly free (for all individuals have universal freedom for their -existent conditions (geographical location, but also and perhaps more importantly the preosed of individuals already determined by given conditions. Living in a understanding of freedom determined (to greater or lesser degrees) viduals immediately understand their spiritual "content as something temporally given" ) Assuredly, many subjects-being freerin relation to the already given , humanity can only seek to overcome the given in terms of the givens to be overcome). ( ) 6 Thus, a nation-[the] contingency [of] unconscious ethical customs [ Sitte] ." ( ) Individuals grasp their universal freedom through activity, and to particular subjectivity essentially, ineradicably "belongs [the contingency of] feeling, intuition, representation." ( ) As such, it is almost inevitable that subjects primarily grasp freedom "as religion in its immediate reality." ( form of representatio ophone literature as "picture-thinking" ( religion nonetheless in its representational content concerns human essence as distinguished from merely natural, individual and cultural contingencies, as the possibility of "ethicality [ , the ethical substance] coming to consciousness of the free universality of its concrete essence." (Enc, existent religion(s)), implicitly posits in its content the free ground of ethical life, or the nonigion is thus both an external determination (qua representation) and from externality (qua spiritual).
III. Catholicism and Protestantism
As such, religion can induce believers to relate to their free essence i -religion is a given determination of ethical life, composed of myth, doctrine, church, ritual, etc., it may present itself as an external religion (free human spirit) may be subsumed into the representational form (myth, ritual and church), thereby creating "a relationship [of the believer to their religion] lacking freedom." ( ) It is just such a relationship that Hegel locates in Catholicism.
While Hegel famously holds that Christianity raised the content of religion to a strictly spiritual principle ( , divorced religion from the "natural element"), "in the Catholic religion, this spirit is in actuality rigidly opposed to self-conscious spirit. ) Grasping freedom through tradiigious externality) provide at best a shaky ground for static and/or force for reactionary revolt in progressive and/or secular ones. rtheir free essence. That is, religion can representationally express the return to essential self from out of external determination. In this case, the external side of religion is put in the service of the spiritual essence it expresses, in that the believer comes through their faith to at least in part see herself as an essentially free being. Such religions etation of them, induce the believer's self-conscious possession of "the certainty of [his-or her-]self in this content as [being] free." ( ) Looking again at the ritual of the Eucharist, Hegel argues that, lacking a theory of transubstantiation, the Protestant faith locates only in the consumption [of it], i.e. in the negation of its externality [and therefore] in belief." ( ) 8 Here, the host is host only through the subjective belief of its recipient, not because it is consecrated by another of authoritative rank. More broadly, Protestantism supersedes Catholicism, for Hegel, just because it makes all religious content a matter of self-conscious, internal faith, not unconscious, external determination. Again, it is here is little same God, revealed through the same son, represented through 8 There is a similar discussion of the Lutheran Eucharist in n , (tr.) E. S. Haldane
Stepelevich, "Hegel and The Lutheran Eucharist," -religious conscience, for Hegel, having emancipated itself from Catholic authority, thereby also "destroyed its base", passing , ( /Automne their representational content, but their relational form, , the "consciousness and subjectivity" of the believer called for by the faith itself. ( ) One faith binds the subject to objective externalities, of determinations through the -certain spirit." ( ) Liberated from spiritual bondage, then, the believer is free to shed other external restrictions to their ethical life. Or, put more precisely, in freeing themselves from priestly determination by understanding their spirit no longer through external authority, but through and as subjective activity, Protestant nations inevitably produced emancipatory advances in the institutional forms of state.
oo-), Protestantism posits marriage as the free use of one's body in loving monogamy. In civil society, the contradicbut paradoxically demands that they enrich others in impoverishing themselves), is superseded by the free " des ] through reason and industry." While Hegel's account is arguably reductive and overly simplistic, confessional creed. In fact, despite claiming that Protestantism's iis the aforementioned institutional forms of ethicality." ( emphasis) That is, as far as philosophy is concerned, "Protestantism" is not primarily a form of faith, but a set of institutional forms that perhaps most importantly, he informs us that "Protestantism" is not simply these forms, as nconcrete emancipation they provide from previous and competing ethical determinations-"the ethicality of marriage against the holine against the holiness of poverty and its idleagainst the y emphasis) Thus, the superiority of "Protestantism" over "Catholicism" lies not in their competing doctrines, or even in their distinct state-forms, but in the institutional advances in human freedom concretely made by Protestant nations against the previously given ethical instituentirely secular, and essentially emancipatory, reasons. Because all religions are grounded in the same content as history and right, , free human spirit, it is only the relational form of belief represented more explicitly and successfully calls the believer to enact freedom's selfhin Christendom. Philosophy's interest in religion lies in the concrete effect on the -institutions agraph of the "World History" section "is the place to elaborate on the ) Thus, in vaunting the Protestant faith over Catholicism, Hegel's arguments should be read as articulating philosophy's interest in the historical effect of a continuing religious dispute. Extrapolating from philosoph comes closest to explicitly expressing the freedom merely pictureigious to ethically act to produce emancipatory changes to the instituaffects the destiny of freedom through nation-states, and is of vital esenting subjects. -emancipation from external rmination against a given, static one. Protestantism, then, represented for Hegel a historical form of religious conscience that concretely facilitated the emancipation of believers from the external authority of church authority and corresponding institutional determinations.
have since come to place similar, perhaps even harsher restrictions Protestant state, for example, free loving monogamy, industrious unbridled, unfair and unproductive markets and a mixture of rote patriotism and reactionary revolt. Much contemporary Protestantism demands fealty to the fundamentalist authority of apparently on the "religiosity" of emancipatory interpretations of them. This accounts of ethical institutions in the , then subtly atory religious sects produce given ethical determinations in the ust once again be overcome, precisely because free "spirit has its actuality in the activity of its self- , that national conscience amenable to, and hopefully rd this conscience does not simply offer hope for concrete social progress, from the pictureeable future) only religion can make manifest, justifying them in part conscience that no longer needs religion to emancipate itself. In progressive liberation of the human spirit. Hegel's philosophical Protestantism, then, may be less a result of personal faith than an dominant contemporary emancipatory historical movement through its representational language, the better to bolster its membership -Lutheran Christians to it. This at least suggests that Hegel may have continued to concern popular movements, or -included Christ. 10 acy of a statutory ecclesiastical faith must of necessity have based his assertions on like authority [for] if the moral sense has entirely taken the direction of the ecclesiastical faith, if this faith has got sole and complete mastery of the heart…then the teacher has no 11 These passages at least suggest that Hegel-throughout his careerhistory, must pay heed to the domi the lives of people in order to help bring about the political changes -states. It is thus not surprising that his itself through, the most commonly held, emancipatory religious discourse of his day, for it is (as yet) only through religious spirit that achieved.
IV. Conclusion
Thus, it is--precisely Hegel's secular, emancipatory condemnation of Catholicism that should lead con--liberation theology. 12 After Vatican II, liberation theology arose in --Bertrand Aristideas a religious movement committed to concretely inducing emancipatory social and political reforms (mainly concerning structurally imposed impoverishment produced through repressive labour conditions) through popular pressure and struggle. Inspired by scripture both through the position of the oppressed and as a perpetual call to ethical and political action. Liberation theology is a believer-centered religion of emancipatory praxis, rather than a churchpeople against the "stable order" originally imposed (as Hegel rightly noted 13 ) upon the people by the Catholic Church, but eventually exacerbated and currently maintained (as Hegel could not anticinscious app Christian texts, rituals and traditions already given to and accepted by the people, liberation theology has fostered a consciously emancipatory spirit amongst those oppressed by Protestant and Catholic states alike.
In closing, let me cite Aristide's remarkably Hegelian understandLiberation theology can itself only be a phase of a broader proon behalf of the impoverished and the oppressed comes to an end as they bcan also include liberation from theology. 14 Given the sheer magnitude of its adherents, the nature of the repression it faces, and the liberating challenge of its belief and resulting praxis, there is arguably no more emancipatory movement presently institutions inspired by it, see amian, -13 -14 -, -
